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GROSS NEGLIGENCE
I
The rule is well established that the operator of an automobile
owes an invited guest a duty to exercise reasonable care M its operation, and will be liable to the guest for ordinary negligence winch
causes injury to him.'
Nevertheless, a few jurisdictions have adopted the rule that gross
negligence must be shown in order to hold the operator liable to his
invited guest, or stated conversely, that only slight care is required
of the operator of an automobile toward his invited guest. The
leading case in support of this view is Massaletti v. Fitzroy2 which,
after a very elaborate review and discussion of the authorities on
the subject, concludes that degrees of negligence are recognized
in Massachusetts, and that
"the measure of liability of one who undertakes to carry
gratis is the same as that of one who undertakes to keep
gratis,"
winch is only for gross negligence in that jurisdiction. Georgia, in
Epps. v. Patshb,3 and Pennsylvania, in Cody v. Venzte 4, also follow
the "gross negligence" doctrine.
THE WASHnnGTON RuLE
The latter doctrine is now firmly established in the Washington
law. The first case of significance seems to be Pinckard v. Peasi,3
in winch a guest was injured when the car skidded through a bridge
railing while the owner was hurrying to take the guest (a doctor)
to the bedside of the owner's mother. The court said that "the
IPerkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, L. R. A. 1916E 1190, 69 So. 875
(1915) Beard v. Klusmeter, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S. W 319, 50 L. R. A. (n.s.)
1100, Ann. Cas. 1915D 342 (1914)
Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 103
Atl. 4, L. R. A. 1918D 205 (1918) Collections of cases in 20 A. L. R. 1014,
note.
228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168, L. R. A. 1918C 2644, Ann. Cas. 1918B 1088,
18 N. C. C. A. 690 (1917)
2 26 Ga. App. 399. 106 S. E. 297 (1921).
'263 Pa. 541, 107 Atl. 383 (1919). But see Ferrell v. Solskz, 278 Pa. 565,
123 Atl. 493 (1924), where the court cited Cody v. Venzze, supra, as authority for the statement that the driver of an automobile was bound to
exercise ordinary care to prevent harm to his guest.
1115 Wash. 282, 197 Pac. 49 (1921).
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degree of care which he was called upon to exercise should be measured by what a reasonable man would have done in the same circumstances," and then qualified this by saying that to hold the driver
liable for negligence under these circumstances, "the negligence
must have been practically gross or wilful." Although this decision
did not definitely indicate the nature of the owner's liability, yet its
very uncertainty may properly be regarded as the opening wedge
in the departure from the general rule of liability
The next case, Heiman v. Klomzner,6 coming five years later, gave
the first intimation of what the court's future holding would be as
to the amount of negligence which would be sufficient to impose
liability upon the host for injuries suffered by his passenger guest.
While declining to definitely fix the amount or kind of care required, the court did make the following observations
"Now in the case before us, it hardly needs argument
to demonstrate that appellant was not required to exercise
that high degree of care in the carrying of respondent in
his automobile merely as his invited guest, that he would
have been required to exercise had he been carrying her in
his automobile for hire. It seems equally plain that, in
carrying respondent in his automobile as he did, appellant
was required to in some measure exercise a higher degree
of care for her safety, than he would have been required to
exercise with reference to the safety of a mere trespasser on
his property That is, his required care was of some degree
between these two extremes."
No mention was made of the former decision of Pinckard v. Pease,
supra, and it is possible that it was overlooked.
About three months later, when the question again arose in Saxe
v. Terry7 the court sitting en bane definitely laid down the rule
that the driver (owner) of an automobile is not liable for injuries
to his invited guest in the absence of a showing of at least gross
negligence on the part of the driver. The court, referring to the
former decision in Heiman v. Klowzner, supra, said
"That opinion does not definitely fix the degree of lack
of care which must be shown by an invited guest before
liability will result. It holds that that degree is somewhere
between that required where the carriage is one for hire
and that neessary to be exercised with reference to the
safety of a mere trespasser. From that it must follow
that before an invited guest can recover a showing of gross
negligence is necessary "
0139 Wash. 655, 247 Pac. 1034 (1926).
'140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926)
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It is apparent from this portion of the opinion that the court
considered gross negligence as the only degree of negligence which
could exist between the limits set out in the Hetman case. It is
submitted that this is an unsound conclusion. In Washington a
carrier is liable to its passenger for bire for slight negligence and
must exercise great care,8 while no duty exists toward a mere trespasser except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring hun.
Between the two extremes, as defined in the Hesman case, of slight
negligence or great care on the one hand, and wanton or wilful injury, or no care at all on the other, ordinary negligence exists, as
well as gross negligence.10
In view of the fact that Saxe v. Terry established the gross negligence rule in Washington wholly on the authority of Heman v.
Klowzner, it may be ventured that the minority rule began its existence in Washington due to a misapprehension of the court as to the
effect of the prior holding.
The rule thus established by Saxe v. Terry has been tenaciously
adhered to in every subsequent decision by the Washington court
in winch the question of liability of the driver to his invited guest
has been raised.
REEASONS FOR THE ADOPTION oF THE RULE BY WASHIM GTON

The reasons for the adoption of the "gross negligence" or minority rule in Washington are not apparent from the decisions. In
Hesman v. Kloisner, where the rule to be subsequently upheld was
first hinted at, the court quoted approvingly from Massaletti v.
Fitzroy," as follows:
PFleming v. Rea Top Cab Co., 133 Wash. 338, 233 Pac. 639 (1925).
'McConkey v. Oregon. 1. 46 Nav. Co., 35 Wash. 55, 76 Pac. 526 (1904)
Gasch v. Rounds, 93
West v. Shaw, 61 Wash. 227, 112 Pac. 243 (1910)
Wash. 317, 160 Pac. 962 (1916) Waller v. Smith, 116 Wash. 645, 200 Pac.
95 (1921). And this rule applies also to injuries resulting to the trespasser from the active negligent conduct of the owner, Kroeger v. Rounds,
83 Wash. 68, 145 Pac. 63 (1914), where trespasser was injured by swinging crane.
20This is necessarily so, no matter what meaning is attributed to "wanton and wilful injury." If it is regarded as a low grade of intentional
misconduct, as in Mass. (Aiken v. Holyoke, 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238,
1903) or as recklessness, as in Wis. (Bolin v. Chscago etc. RR., 108 Wis.
333, 84 N. W 446, 1900) or as a mere failure to exercise ordinary care to
avoid active injury to a seen trespasser, as in the Federal courts (Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth R.R., 76 Fed. 201, 22 C. C. A. 121, 1896), the conclusion, nevertheless, follows that ordinary negligence is to be found
between the limits set by the court, as well as gross negligence. Indeed, if
either of the last two definitions of 'wanton and wilful injury" are accepted it is arguable that the kind of misconduct usually indicated by the
term "gross negligence" has either been excluded altogether or set as
the lower limit of the two extremes.
"1Supra.
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"Approaching the question apart from authority, we are
led to the same conclusion. Justsce requires that the one
who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously should not
be under the same measure of obligation as one who enters
upon the same undertaking for pay There is an inherent
difficulty in stating the difference between the measure of
duty which is assumed in the two cases. But justice requires that to make out liability in case of a gratuitous
undertaking, the plaintiff ought to prove where the defendant is to be paid for doing the same thing."
In the brief of the appellant in that case, which was substantially
followed by the court, the point was made that
"As a matter of right and even of common decency he
ought not to accept the courtesy of a friend or stranger for
his own advantage or pleasure and then, in case an accident happens through some such common and casual carelessness, sue for damages. The driver is taking as much
care for the safety of the guest as he is for his own safety
He has no desire or intention through any acts of omission
or commission of his own to put his guest in peril. It would
seem to be a just and righteous rule that when for his own
pleasure or convenience one asks or accepts the hospitality
of another, he takes upon himself the risk of such injury
as may result from that casual or ordinary negligence
which even careful drivers sometimes display "
and it is probable that the argument influenced the court in its
decision.
It is apparent from the above quotation from Massaletti v. Fitzroy that the Massachusetts court adopted the rule of gross negligence as a matter of inherent justice. Indeed, the legislatures have
in some jurisdictions deemed the rule which permits a guest to
recover damages from his host for a failure to exercise ordinary care
so obnoxious that they have passed measures granting the host a
liberal immunity from liability to the guest. Thus in Oregon an
act was passed designed to deprive a guest of redress in damages
for an injury negligently inflicted upon him by his host if he was
being transported without charge. This act was later held unconstitutional because it deprived the guest of any remedy whatsoever
against the host. 2 A more reasonable act passed by Connecticut in
1927 releasing the owner or operator of motor vehicles from liability to gratuitous guests for damages in case of accident "unless
such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner
or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard
12Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998, 61 A. L. R. 1236 (1928).
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of the rights of others," was upheld, although it barred recovery
for injuries caused by ordinary negligence. 18 An Iowa statute
passed in 1927,14 which provided that the owner or operator of an
automobile should not be liable to a guest unless the damage was
caused by the driver's being under the influence of liquor or by
his reckless operation, is still in effect, but the question of its constitutionality has not arisen. It is reasonable to suppose that its
constitutionality will be upheld, however, for the act is similar in
its effect to the Connecticut statute.
Due to the fact that the Supreme Court of Washington has not
expressed its reasons for adopting the minority rule, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Washington court was moved, as was
the Massachusetts court, and the several state legislatures, by the
injustice involved in permitting a guest to accept the invitation and
hospitality of his host in enjoying the automobile and then, upon
being injured while riding with him, to retaliate by suing his host
for damages.
SHOULD WASHIGTON

HAVE

ADOPTED

THE MI NORITY RULE?

But even though such was the attitude of the Washington courts,
it is to be regretted that they have adopted the "gross negligence"
rule.
By this holding, the Washington court departed from the doetrine of ordinary care which it had followed in all personal injury
cases prior to that time, with-the exception of the cases where a
common carrier was involved,"5 and injected itself into the age old
argument of the advisability of recognizing degrees of care, or con6
versely, of degrees of negligence. In an early case, Wilson v. Brett,"
Lord Cranworth (then Baron Rolfe) made a statement which has
since become very famous and has been often cited--"there is no
difference between negligence and gross negligence-it is the same
thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet." Some years
7
later in the well known case of the Steamboat New World v. King
Curtis, J., said.
"The theory that there are three degrees of negligence
"Silver
v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 AtI. 240 (1928), affirmed in Silver
v. Silver, 74 L. Ed. Adv. Op. 67 (1929).
1"

Iowa Code 1927, sec. 5026bl.

Sears v. Seattle Consolidated Street R. Co., 6 Wash. 227, 33 Pac. 389,
1081 (1893) Flemng v. Red Top Cab Co., 133 Wasb. 338, 233 Pac. 639
(3925).
'11 Mees & W 113, 115, 116, 152 Eng. Reprint 737 (1843).
16 How. 469, 14 L. Ed. 1019 (1853).
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described by the terms slight, ordinary and gross, has been
introduced into the common law from some of the commentators on the Roman Law It may be, doubted if these
terms can be usefully applied m practice. Their meaning
is not fixed or capable of being so. One degree thus described, not only may be confounded with another, but it is
quite impracticable to distinguish them."
It cannot be denied that the modern tendency of the decisions
and the weight of authority is to the effect that a classification of
negligence into compartments or degrees is useless and in any case
negligence is merely the failure to exercise ordinary care under the
circumstances. Thus in Brsggs v. Spaulding18 the United States
Supreme Court, in one of the leading cases on the subject, made
the following statement with reference to the terms ordinary, gross
and slight negligence
"In each the negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is
the failure to give and bestow the care which the situation
demands, and hence it is more strictly accurate, perhaps,
to call it simply negligence, and this seems to be the tendency of modern authorities."'9
From these authorities it seems clear that when the Washington
court deviated from the doctrine of ordinary care in this relation,
it ran contra to the great weight of authority by reverting to the
older conception of degrees of negligence. No doubt the court felt
the injustice of the situation and arbitrarily ruled that a guest
should not recover from his host for less than gross negligence.
But even though the Washington court did feel that the operator
of an automobile was bound to exercise less care toward his invited
guest than toward a pasesnger for hire, as it stated in Hesman v.
Klozzner, and approved in Saxe v. Terry, it seems clear that an
application of the usual rule, that of ordinary care under the circumstances, would have accomplished the desired result. The term
"circumstances" would include the relations of the parties-the
fact that the invited guest was a gatuitous passenger for his own
benefit and therefore entitled to a less amount of care than a pas20
senger for hire.
11 Sup. Ct. 924, 141 U. S. 132, 35 L. Ed. 662 (1890).

"The authorities in accord with this view are legion. For a comprehensive collection of them see 1 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 18 and
notes. The Washington court has admitted that it follows the minority
view
"Also see Citti v. Bava (Cal. App.), 254 Pac. 299 (1927), which held
that driver owed different amount of care to guest from that owed to others
in same accident, although both governed by ordinary care rule.
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To go to the extent of holding that a driver is liable to his guest
only for gross negligence, is really a case of judicial legislation. It
is submitted that from a legal standpoint it would have been a more
desirable procedure for the court to merely have applied the established ordinary care test to this situation, leaving it to the legislaure to change the rule if an injustice was thereby imposed upon the
operator of the automobile. That is the course which the overwhelmmg majority of courts have followed, and in three of the
states legislation has been passed to remedy the situation by limiting or releasing the driver from liability to his guest."'
To sum up, the following statement may be made By judicial
legislation Washington has apparently limited the liability of the
driver of an automobile to his guest to practically the same extent
that Connecticut did by legislation. But Washington accomplished
its result only by the overturning of certain well accepted common
law principles, while Connecticut did so by a more desirable method,
i. e., through a retention of the ordinary care doctrine, and a legislative act to rectify the hardship which was thought to necessarily
result from the application of it.
II.
THE GRoss NEGLIGENCE RULE

Because of the fact that Washington has definitely and unequivocally adopted the "gross negligence" rule, disapproval of the term
"gross negligence" and objections to the doctrine based upon the
inability to understand or formulate the distinction between
gross and ordinary negligence, which at various times and in divers
jurisdictions have found their way into judicial opinions, are no
longer of practical consequence in a discussion of the local law If
the criterion of the liability of an automobile driver to his invited
guest is gross negligence, it would seem that the vital problem is to
determine what is meant by the term "gross negligence" as used in
the Washington cases. How much evidence of negligence, or how obvious evidence of negligence must any attorney introduce on behalf
of his client to avoid the direction of a verdict against him 2 When
must a trial judge grant a nonsuit or give judgment for the defendant in an action by an invited guest against his host9 If some
definite answer can be given, it will undoubtedly be an aid to those
lawyers and judges having for their consideration situations in22
volving this question.
2See notes 12, 13 and 14, supra.
2 It is too much to hope for an analysis of gross negligence that will
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There is no well settled concept of gross negligence at common
law. The term has been the subject of definitions which range all
the way from the statement that there is no legal distinction between
'23
gross negligence and ordinary negligence, at one end of the scale,
to the holding at the other end that it is synonymous with wilful or
wanton negligence, 4 and that the element of inadvertence is totally
eliminated from it.

2 .

Some courts have said that it is the want of that diligence which
even careless men are accustomed to exercise, 2 and others that it is
the entire absence of care.2 7 It has also been defined as an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences, 2 and as such an entire want of care which would
raise a presumption as to the conscious indifference as to consequences. 20 One of the most elaborate attempts to define gross negligence was made by the Massachusetts court in Altman v. Aronson,3 °
where Rugg, C. J., said that gross negligence is "the want of even
scant care," "heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others," "a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a
person of ordinary prudence," "short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong."
These selections from the hundreds of attempts of courts to
iron out all the wrinkles. But if it can be demonstrated just what kind
of test has been adopted as a criterion of gross negligence and what kind
of evidence is necessary to make out a prima fac?e case, something will
have been accomplished.
Wilson v. Brett, 11 Mees. & W 113 (1843) Milwaukee & St. P R. R.
Go. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. Ed. 374 (1876).
21Bouchard v. Dtigo Mut. Fire Ins Co., 114 Me. 361, 96 Atl. 244 (1916)
Poling v. Ohio R. Co., 38 W Va. 645, 18 S. E. 782, 24 L. R. A. 215 (1893).
Astin v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P Ry Co., 143 Wis. 477, 128 N. W
265, 31 L. R. A. (n.s.) 158 (1910).
Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 Pac. 910, 30 L.
R. A. (n.s.) 409, Ann. Cas. 1912A 55 (1910) Louisville & Nashville R. R.
v. Smith, 135 Ky 462, 122 S. W 806 (1909)
"Heline v. Great Western Milling Co., 43 Cal. App. 416, 185 Pac. 510
(1919) Farmers' Mercantile Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 27 N. D. 302,
146 N. W 550 (1914).
28Denman v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387, 48 N. W 565 (1891) Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Orr 121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35 (1914)
' There are many other conceptions of gross negligence to be found in
the common law cases. Lord Holt referred to gross negligence as dishonesty (Coggs. v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Rymd. 909) Judge Cooley said it was less
than an axercise of ordinary care, but left it to the jury to say how much
less (Flint-Pere Marquette R. R. Co. v. Wezr 37 Mich. 111 (1877))
The
only respect in which they all agree is that gross negligence is something
less than an exercise of ordinary care.
"0231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 505, 4 A. L. R. 1185 (1919)
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clearry state the distinction between gross negligence, and the other
degrees of negligence merely illustrate that they have generally regarded it as being something more than a failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, and that they have not agreed
upon the type of misconduct of which one must be guilty in order
to be grossly negligent. Consequently, it is obviously not determinable from the common law authorities what the Washington court
had in mind when they used the term.
ITS APPLICATION IN THE WASHINGTON CASES

An examination of the Washington cases casts some light upon
the question. In four of the decisions m which the right of the
invited guest to recover from the driver was adjudicated, the facts
were somewhat similar. In each the driver while attempting to
negotiate a curve at about thirty to forty miles per hour skidded
on loose gravel, or on fresh snow, injuring the guest in the resulting
accident. In all of these cases the court held as a matter of law
that the defendant driver was not guilty of gross negligence, and
that the guest could not recover.31
In Hesman v. Kloizner32 the guest was injured when the driver's
auto swerved down an embanlunent as a result of a collision with
another car, and the court held as a matter of law that there was
not sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the driver to
warrant a recovery by the guest.
Probably the strongest case on its facts for the guest, where the
supreme court denied hin recovery, was the case of Klopfenstem v.
Eads." There the driver stopped his truck on the traveled portion of the highway, in violation of a statute, in order to put up the
curtains at the request of the guest. While doing so a logging
truck approached and after giving warning and signals for the
defendant to move his truck from the highway, which defendant
heard and understood but disregarded, struck the truck of defendant, overturning it and killing the guest who was sitting in the
truck. Again the court held as a matter of law that the defendant
was not guilty of gross negligence, and that the question should
not have been submitted to the jury, even though the violation of
the statute constituted negligence per se.
"Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926)
Blood 'v. Austin,
149 Wash. 41, 270 Pac. 103 (1928) Dailey 'v. Phoenix Inv. Co., 55 Wash.
Dec. 477, 285 Pac. 657 (1930) Pinckard v. Pease, 115 Wash. 282, 197 Pac.
49 (1921).
'139 Wash. 655, 247 Pac. 1034 (1926).
$2143 Wash. 104, 254 Pac. 854, 256 Pac. 333 (1927).
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The two remaining decisions are the only ones in which a passenger guest has been allowed to recover from his host by the Washington supreme court. The first was Adair v. Newksrk, 4 where the
facts were that at night, as the driver followed another car, an automobile with lights plainly visible to the defendant approached from
the opposite direction. There was not sufficient room to pass the
car in front of the defendant's automobile, but the driver "in gross
disregard of the safety of his guest" attempted to do so, and in the
ensuing collision with the oncoming car the guest was injured.
There the court held the defendant guilty of gross negligence as
a matter of law, as he showed a total disregard of all care and
caution. "Therefore, where as here, there is shown no care whatever was exercised, in a situation involving great danger, the conclusion of gross negligence follows."
The other case in which recovery was allowed the guest was
Trotter v. Bullock, 5 where the driver was intoxicated and driving
at a reckless rate of speed down a city street when the guest was
injured in a collision with a telephone pole.
To summarize, it may be said that the Washington court has
denied recovery to the guest in six out of the eight cases which
came to it for consideration, reversing trial court verdicts or finding
in favor of the guest in five of these. In each case the result reached
by the court was made a matter of law under the facts of that particular case as the court understood them.38 In no case did the
court explain their concept of "gross negligence," except to adopt
Sherman and Redfield 's37 statement that "Gross negligence is said
to be the want of slight care" (Saxe v. Terry, Klopfenstesn v. Eads,
Blood v. Austin), and to make the following statement, "A substantial distinction exists between gross negligence and ordinary negligence as well as between slight negligence and ordinary negligence,
and it is one not too indefinite to be drawn by the court and acted
upon by the jury," and then proceed to close the case without drawing the distinction.
However, in spite of the fact that no definite criterion was set
forth by any one decision, from a consideration of the facts of the
cases decided, in relation to the result reached, it appears to be
3"148 Wash. 165, 268 Pac. 153 (1928)
25148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825 (1928).
"' In Blood v. Austin the court gave a full expression to this view by
holding that the trial court should have decided as a matter of law that
there was no evidence of gross negligence to go to the jury. 149 Wash. 41,
270 Pac. 103 (1928)
" Sherman & Redfield, Law of Negligence (6th ed.), see. 49, p. 93.
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evident what meaning the court intended to convey by its use of
the term "gross negligence."
It seems that to permit the invited guest to recover from the
driver of the automobile in Washington, the conduct of the latter
must be such as to evidence a total want of care and a reckless
disregard of the probable consequences which he must have realized
would follow from has act or omission to act. It is something different from negligence, which is mere inadvertence. The court has
required the showing of consciousness of the result and complete
indifference as to injury, which involves another element beside the
mere inadvertence characteristic of negligence.8 8 It has the element
of consciousness, of knowledge or realization of the danger involved,
of the probable consequences to follow, and a determination to act
or fail to act in that state of mind. Although the state of mind is
not material in the case of ordinary negligence, various terms have
been used to denominate the state of mind in such a case as this
as "rashly," "recklessly," "wilfully," and "wantonly " The element of inadvertence is absent. The wrong is characterized by an
absence of any care on the part of the driver to avoid inflicting
an injury to the guest by recklessly acting or failure to act to avoid
doing such injury, and evincing a total disregard of the consequences.
The writers have encountered the same difficulties in expressing
the exact concept which they believe the Washington court has
identified with the term "gross negligence" that judges have experienced for centuries m attempting to define the term. Significantly, however, the conclusion reached here closely approxmates
that reached under the "Guest Statute" in Connecticut,89 where it
was said that "conduct indicating a reckless disregard of the rights
of others is quite distinct in its characteristics from merely negligent conduct. Conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness,
inadvertence, or from an error of judgment does not indicate a
reckless disregard of the rights of others."
The instructions which are used by the judges of the Superior
Court of King County are in accordance with this conception of
the term. As an example, the instruction which was used in the
3s In effect this is the meaning of the frequently repeated statement
of the court that the host owes only a duty of slight care to the guest, and
will be liable only for gross negligence. Blood, v. Austin, supra ("as to
an invited guest one is required to exercise only slight care and will be
liable only for gross negligence").
mBordonaro v. Senc, 109 Conn. 428, 147 At. 136 (1929) Ascher v.
Friedman (Conn). 147 Atl. 263 (1929).
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trial of Brainerdv. Stearns40 told the jury that, "You are instructed that one riding by invitation and gratuitously in another's automobile, cannot recover for injury caused by the host's negligence
in driving unless it amounted to gross negligence. 'Gross negligence' as applied to the case means wilful recklessness and utter
disregard for the safety of the guest, the failure to use slight care
for the safety of the guest."
The conclusion reached herein is also supported by the fact that
in each of the cases where recovery was denied as a matter of law,
there was sufficient evidence of negligent conduct to justify a jury
in returning a verdict of negligence against the driver, but there
was no evidence of any state of mind except inadvertence, while in
the decisions permitting the guest to recover there was the element
of consciousness of the danger involved, and of indifference to the
consequences, coupled with the fact that no care whatever was exercised by the driver.
It is also supported by a comparison of the Washington cases
with those of other jurisdictions, which follow the ordinary care
rule, and having somewhat similar facts. Despite a statement made
by the Maine court 4' that, although the ordinary negligence and
gross negligence rules differ as to definition, the application of the
different rules to a given state of facts would effect the same result
as far as liability is concerned, an examination of the authorities
indicates a different conclusion. 'While it is true that the facts in
some cases which have awarded damages to the guest under the
ordinary care rule would also support a holding of gross negligence, as was observed in Epps v. Partsh,42 the converse of that
observation does not follow Thus there are many cases in the books
which have imposed liability upon the driver in favor of his invited
guest by the application of the ordinary care rule, while under
similar facts the Washington court has held as a matter of law that
there was no gross negligence on the part of the driver.
Thus in Pearson v. LakM43 the facts were very similar to the
Heiman case in Washington. The automobile in which the plaintiff
guest and defendant driver were traveling collided with another
car at an intersection, zigzagged across the street and down an
1055 Wash. Dec. 270, 284, Pac. 348 (1930)

"Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 103 AtI. 4, L. R. A. 1918D 205 (1918).
"126 Ga. App. 399, 106 S. E. 297 (1912).
"147 Md. 1, 127 AtI. 387 (1925).
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embankment, injuring the guest. A verdict for the plaintiff was
there affirmed.
Recovery was also allowed in Mackenzie v. Oakley,44 where the
car skidded on the wet pavement and ran into a telegraph pole.
Likewise in Fitzjarrel v. Boyd" the guest was permitted to recover under a situation where the automobile skidded and struck a
telephone pole.
The Vermont court in Robznson v. Leonard0 awarded the guest
damages where the defendant lost control of his car on a newly
tarred road covered with gravel and went into a ditch.
Under a showing that the defendant driver lost control of his
car, went off the road and hit a stump, the Texas court allowed
47
recovery to the guest in Cannon v. Dupree.
And in Nicora v. Cerver, 48 where the automobile skidded on a
curve and struck a guy wire a verdict for the guest was affirmed.
The defendant was driving too close to the edge of the road,
struck a small ditch and over turned. The Nebraska court in Bauer
v. Gmess49 affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff under those facts.
The Washington court has denied recovery in factual situations
sinilar to each of the above cases.
The difference in result is further evidenced by a comparison
of the case from other states which allow a guest to recover on a
showing of a breach of a statute regulating the operation of an
automobile on the highway"0 with the Washington case which has
held that a breach of statute, although negligence per se, does not
warrant a recovery by the guest,5' apparently upon the theory that
a violation of statute can only be regarded as inadvertence of some
"94 N. J.L. 66, 108 Atl. 771 (1925).
123 Md. 497, 91 Atl. 547 (1914).
"100 Vt. 1,134 Atl. 706 (1926)
7--Tex.Civ. App. 294 S.W 298 (1927).
"849 Nev.261, 244 Pac. 897 (1926).
"0105 Neb. 381, 181 N. W 156 (1920).
"Sprtng v. McCabe, 53 Cal. App. 330, 200 Pac. 41 (1921), breach of ex-

press violation of Motor Vehicle Act limiting speed- of autbmobiles to 35
miles per hour- Dougherty v. Ellingson (Cal. App.), 275 Pac. 456 (1929),
failure to yield right of way to car coming from right, as provided in sec.
131(a) of the Calif. Vehicle Act (as amended by St. 1925, p. 412) Cohen

v. Silverman, 153 Minn. 391, 190 N. W 795 (1922), breach of statute requiring car to pass to the right of the center of the intersection in making left
turn. Gen. St. Minn. 1913 Sec. 2634, as amended by Chap. 472, Laws 1921
Sec. 6,p.785.
GKlopfenstem v. Eads, 143 Wash. 104, 254 Pac. 854 (1927), breach of
Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 6347, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any
person to leave any vehicle standing upon the main traveled portion of
any highway.
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degree, whereas gross negligence requires that attitude on the part
of the defendant toward his conduct which has been characterized
as recklessness and a total disregard of consequences.
Since this article was completed another "gross negligence"
decision has been handed down by the Washington court. In Eastman v. Silva, 2 the court m discussing the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the trial court found the defendant guilty of
gross negligence, said "Premising our discussion upon our own
definition of 'gross negligence' as the want of slight care," etc.
This statement reaffirms the view taken by the court m prior cases
as to the nature of gross negligence, and lends added weight to the
conclusion reached by the writers that gross negligence, as used in
those cases, means a total lack of care, or a reckless disregard of
probable consequencs.
FRANK L. M _m.0Hx.

LowEL P M]cxEwmT.t

"56 Wash. Dec. 496 (1930).
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.

t University of Washington.

